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Abstract
This study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy
when a violation of debt rules is possible. To address this issue, the study extends
the framework of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (American Economic Review 105, (2015),
1711–1737) by allowing for rule breaking with extra costs, and we show that rule
breaking occurs when a country exhibits a strong present bias. We further extend
the model by introducing a political process for determining the debt rule, and we
show that a polarization of debt rules emerges between countries with high and low
degrees of present bias.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, many developed countries have experienced large budget deficits and
rapidly growing public debt. In 2007, the average general government gross debt in
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries,
as a percentage of GDP, was 53.34%, and it increased to 85.58% in 2015. In particular,
the ratio increased by more than 60 points in Greece, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom.1 This raises concerns about the sustainability of public finances and
highlights the need for fiscal rules in achieving fiscal consolidation (IMF, 2009).
Fiscal rules are expected to constrain the behavior of governments, but the enforce-
ability of these rules is questionable, as indicated by Alesina and Passalacqua (2016). As
reported in Wyplosz (2013), the United Kingdom adopted two fiscal rules in 1997: (1)
the budget deficit may only finance public investment and (2) the debt-to-GDP ratio may
not exceed 40 percent. However, while the rule was met for a few years, slippage set
in after 2002. Wyplosz (2013) also reports that in the euro area, the Maastricht treaty
specifies that budget deficits cannot exceed 3 percent, but this rule has been satisfied
only 60 percent of time over the thirteen years that the euro has existed. The evidence
suggests that, in practice, the conditions required for fiscal institutions are rarely met.
To investigate why fiscal rule violations occur so frequently, the present study focuses
on time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences. When agents are endowed with such
preferences, they change their ex-ante consumption plans, choosing to consume more in
the present and less in the future (Laibson, 1997). In particular, they are incentivized to
support, via voting, a large public debt issue; this enables them to obtain a great deal of
resources for consumption today through transfers financed by the debt issuance. Bisin,
Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015) is the first study to present a model of public debt that includes
such an incentive mechanism.
In the framework of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015), the government, representing
the present-biased agents, is assumed to stick to a given debt rule; the rule breaking is
1Source: OECD.stat. https://stats.oecd.org/ (Accessed on June 12, 2019).
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abstracted away from their analysis. However, if the rule breaking is available through
the payment of extra costs, the agents may find it optimal to support the issue of public
debt above the debt ceiling. Such rule breaking depends on the degree of present bias, but
this degree differs among countries, as reported in Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2016). Thus,
the following questions arise naturally: (a) how present-biased preferences influence the
choice of public debt issuance when rule breaking is possible and (b) what kind of a debt
rule must be put in place in response to the degree of present bias. The purpose of this
study is to address these questions.
For analysis, we use the simple three-period model developed by Bisin, Lizzeri, and
Yariv (2015). Agents are endowed with goods in period 1 and make savings and portfolio
decisions; they receive utility from consumption in periods 2 and 3. Period-2 selves are
endowed with present-biased preferences, so they are tempted to increase consumption
in period 2 at the cost of reduced consumption in period 3. Period-1 selves use illiquid
assets to constrain the consumption plans of their future selves. However, the government,
representing the period-2 selves, is induced to issue public debt to respond to the desire of
the period-2 selves to undo the commitment in period 1. This gives sophisticated agents
an incentive to rebalance their portfolios in period 1 to reestablish their commitment
consumption sequence. This in turn creates demand for further debt accumulation.
Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015) control the behavior of present-biased agents by im-
posing a debt ceiling. Our model differs from theirs in that debt issue beyond the ceiling
is available by incurring some additional costs. Within this extended framework, we show
that the benefits of rule breaking outweigh the costs, and, thus, rule breaking occurs if
the present bias is extremely strong and the debt ceiling is fairly low. The result could
be viewed as providing one possible key to understanding the phenomenon of fiscal rule
breaking often observed in developed countries.
The assumption of a fixed debt ceiling follows that in Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015).
This assumption is reasonable in the short run, but in the long run there must be ten-
dency toward the revision of fiscal rules. For instance, according to the US Department of
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the Treasury, the US debt ceiling has been raised 78 times since 1960.2 Another example
involves Japan, which has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among all developed countries.
Despite the urgent need for fiscal consolidation, Japan pushed back the target year for
achieving a primary balance surplus from 2020 to 2025 given its slow recovery from the re-
cession.3 The evidence suggests that fiscal rules are not necessarily rigorous requirements,
but can be easily revised in accordance with economic and political conditions.
Motivated by this evidence, we extend the analysis by introducing the endogenous
determination of the debt ceiling via voting. In particular, we consider a situation where
period-1 selves set the debt ceiling, taking into account the response of the period-2 selves.
Under this setting, we investigate how the present-biased preferences affect the design of
debt ceiling, and show the following result. When the present bias is weak, period-2
selves have little incentive to change their consumption plans and thus to issue public
debt. They follow this debt rule even if the ceiling is set at the lowest level, that is, even
if the debt issue is prohibited. Therefore, the debt ceiling is set at zero, which is optimal
from the viewpoint of the period-1 selves’ utility maximization.
When the present bias is strong, the marginal benefits of rule breaking outweigh the
costs for the period-2 selves. Thus, the period-1 selves find it impossible to make the
period-2 selves follow the rule of no debt issue. To avoid the costs of rule breaking,
period-1 selves set the ceiling at a maximum level such that the period-2 selves never
break it. The result, thus far, suggests that there is a threshold level for the present
bias such that the optimal ceiling for the period-1 selves varies in a discontinuous manner
around the threshold. This result could be viewed as providing one possible explanation
for the cross-county difference in debt rules and the resulting levels of public debt among
developed countries.
As mentioned above, the present study is closely related to Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv
(2015), who demonstrate the role of present-biased preferences in fiscal policy making. The
2Source: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-
service/debt-limit (accessed on September 27, 2019)
3Source: https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai-shimon/kaigi/cabinet/2018/2018 basicpolicies en.pdf (ac-
cessed on September 27, 2019)
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study is also related to Halac and Yared (2018), who analyze the formation of fiscal rules
in the presence of present-biased preferences in a multi-country economy. In particular,
they compare coordinated rules, chosen jointly by a group of countries, to uncoordinated
rules, chosen independently by each country, and show that the coordinated rules are
slacker when the present bias is large. However, rule breaking is abstracted away from
their analysis. The present study, in contrast, allows rule breaking, and it derives the
optimal rules under the possibility of rule breaking by present-biased voters.
The present study also contributes to the literature on the political economy of public
debt, such as Cukierman and Meltzer (1989); Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012);
Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate (2016); Barseghyan and Battaglini (2016); and Arai,
Naito, and Ono (2018). In all of these studies, it is assumed that agents are not present
biased, and fiscal rules are taken as given. The present work advances the previous
studies by relaxing these assumptions, and it shows how public debt accumulation and
the determination of fiscal rules are affected by the present-biased preferences of voters.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section lays out the model. The third
section demonstrates the agents’ saving decisions and the government’s fiscal policy
decision. The fourth section characterizes the equilibrium allocation. The fifth section
extends the model to the endogenous determination of debt rules, and the last section
concludes. Proofs for the propositions are in the appendix.
2 The Model
The model is based on the one developed by Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015). It measures
identical agents who live for three periods, 1, 2, and 3. They are endowed with k units of
goods in period 1 and nothing in periods 2 and 3. In period 1, agents only make savings
and portfolio decisions; they receive utility from consumption in periods 2 and 3.
Agents (hereafter interchangeably called individuals, selves, and voters) have time-
inconsistent, present biased preferences (Laibson, 1997). In particular, the agents’ pref-
erences over consumption in periods 2 and 3, c2 and c3, are given by the following utility
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functions:
U1(c2, c3) = β [u (c2) + u (c3)] ,
U2 (c2, c3) = u (c2) + βu (c3) ,
where Ut (t = 1, 2) is the assessed utility at time t, u is a continuous and strictly concave
utility function, and β ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter representing the degree of present bias; a
lower β implies that period-2 agents are biased toward more period-2 consumption. Agents
are assumed to be sophisticated; they are fully aware of their self-control problems.
Agents choose to invest their wealth, k, in liquid or illiquid assets in period 1. It is
assumed that all liquid and illiquid assets have the same exogenous interest rate of zero.
Liquid assets are one-period securities that are sold in period t (t = 1, 2) and redeemed
in period t + 1. Illiquid assets are two-period securities that are sold in period 1 and
redeemed in period 3; they cannot be sold in period 2. Savings in one- and two-period
securities in period 1 are denoted by, s12 and s13, respectively; the subscript ij means the
time of saving, i, and redemption, j. In period 2, agents can save the return from s12 in
one-period securities; this saving is denoted by s23.
Agents displaying present-biased preferences suffer from self-control problems. In par-
ticular, period-2 selves are tempted to increase consumption in period 2 at the cost of
reduced consumption in period 3. Period-1 selves use illiquid assets to constrain the con-
sumption plans of their future selves. However, the government, representing period-2
selves, is induced to issue public debt in the international market to respond to period-2
selves’ desire to undo the commitment made in period 1. This gives sophisticated agents
an incentive to rebalance their portfolios in period 1 to reestablish their consumption
sequence commitment. This, in turn, creates demand for further debt accumulation. The
debt issue, denoted by d, is assumed to be costly and constrained by the constitutionally
imposed borrowing limits denoted by d¯, but debt issue beyond the limit is available by
incurring some additional costs, as specified below.
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The timing of events and the optimization problem at each stage are as follows. In
period 1, an agent, who predicts an equilibrium per capita public debt level of d and
period 2 savings, s23, chooses period 1 savings intended for period 2, s12, and for period
3, s13, to maximize the assessed utility in period 1, U1. Since the debt level is determined
through voting, each agent takes it as given when making his or her saving decision. The
problem of the agent in period 1 is:
max
s12,s13
U1 = β [u (c2) + u (c3)]
s.t. s12 + s13 ≤ k,
c2 ≤ s12 + d
e − s23,
c3 ≤ s13 + s23 −G(d
e),
s12, s13, s23 ≥ 0,
given s23 and d
e,
where de denotes the expected level of debt issue in period 2.
The first, second, and third constraints are the period-1, -2, and -3 budget constraints.
Following Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015), we assume that (i) private borrowing is not
allowed, as expressed in the fourth constraint, and (ii) debt is financed by foreign lenders
at an interest rate of zero, but can be directly distortionary.4 The term G(d), representing
the costs of debt repayment, is specified as follows:
G(d) =


(1 + η) d when d ≤ d¯,
(1 + η) d¯+ (1 + η + γ)
(
d− d¯
)
when d > d¯,
where η > 0 and γ > 0. The term η represents the marginal costs of debt issue, such
as labor supply distortions induced by increased tax burdens for debt repayment. The
term γ represents the marginal cost of rule breaking: the government is required to pay
extra costs for each debt issue beyond the debt ceiling. An example of such costs is the
4The assumption of a zero interest rate is for simplicity of exposition.
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administrative costs incurred by the government in passing a bill that allows it to issue
debt above the ceiling.
In period 2, an agent chooses the savings intended for period 3, s23, taking d
e as given,
to maximize the assessed utility in period 2, U2. The problem of the period-2 agents is:
max
s23
U2 = u (c2) + βu (c3)
s.t. c2 ≤ s12 + d
e − s23,
c3 ≤ s13 + s23 −G(d
e),
s23 ≥ 0,
given s12, s13, and d
e,
where s12 and s13 satisfy s12 + s13 ≤ k and solve the period-1 problem. The government,
representing period-2 selves, chooses public debt issue, d, to maximize the utility of period-
2 agents, subject to a non-negativity constraint, d ≥ 0, and a constitutionally imposed
debt ceiling, d¯, given s12, s13, and s23.
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For our analysis, we make the following assumptions. First, the utility function is
specified as
u (c) =
(c)1−σ − 1
1− σ
,
where σ (> 0) is an inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. This assumption
enables us to solve the model analytically. Second, the borrowing must be below the
natural debt limit, k/η, to prevent the government from defaulting. In addition, to define
the debt ceiling, it is assumed that the ceiling is below the natural debt limit, as in the
following assumption:
Assumption 1: d¯ < k/η.
5Lending in the international market, d < 0, is abstracted away from the analysis since our focus is
on borrowing, d > 0. Allowing for d < 0 does not qualitatively alter the following result.
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3 Decisions of Agents and Government
As mentioned above, agents are assumed to be sophisticated. Thus, we solve the model
through backward induction; that is, we first solve the government’s problem in period
2, then the agents’ problem in period 2, and finally the agents’ problem in period 1. Our
result would not change if the timing within period 2 is reversed because the period-2
selves and the government share the same objective.
3.1 Government’s Period-2 Decision
The problem of the government, representing the period-2 selves, is
max
d≥0
Vg (d; s12, s23) ≡
(s12 + d− s23)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
+ β ·
(k − s12 + s23 −G(d))
1−σ − 1
1− σ
s.t. G(d) =


(1 + η)d when d ≤ d¯,
(1 + η + γ)d− γd¯ when d > d¯,
given s12 and s23,
where Vg denotes the period-2 government’s objective function. The first derivatives, with
respect to d when d ≤ d¯ and d > d¯, are, respectively,
∂Vg (d; s12, s23)
∂d
∣∣∣∣
d≤d¯
= (s12 + d− s23)
−σ
− β (1 + η) · (k − s12 + s23 − (1 + η)d)
−σ , (1)
∂Vg (d; s12, s23)
∂d
∣∣∣∣
d>d¯
= (s12 + d− s23)
−σ
− β (1 + η + γ) ·
(
k − s12 + s23 − (1 + η + γ)d+ γd¯
)−σ
. (2)
Let du and dc denote interior solutions when d ≤ d¯ and d > d¯, respectively. They are
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given by
du (s12, s23) =
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
]
(s12 − s23)
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
, (3)
dc
(
s12, s23, d¯
)
=
k + γd¯−
[
1 + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
]
(s12 − s23)
(1 + η + γ) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
, (4)
where du (s12, s23) and d
c
(
s12, s23, d¯
)
satisfy
dc
(
s12, s23, d¯
)
⋛ d¯ ⇔ A (s12, s23) ≡
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
]
(s12 − s23)
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
⋛ d¯,
and6
A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) .
The condition of A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) implies that there are four possible cases,
classified according to the relative magnitude among du (s12, s23), A (s12, s23), and d¯, as
illustrated in Figure 1: du (s12, s23) ≤ 0 ≤ d¯ (Panel (a)), 0 < d
u (s12, s23) < d¯ (Panel
(b)), A (s12, s23) ≤ d¯ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) (Panel (c)), and d¯ < A (s12, s23) (Panel (d)). From the
figure, we can find that the solution d for the government problem, denoted by d (s12, s23),
as follows:
d (s12, s23) =


0 when du (s12, s23) ≤ 0,
du (s12, s23) when 0 < d
u (s12, s23) < d¯,
d¯ when A (s12, s23) ≤ d¯ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) ,
dc
(
s12, s23, d¯
)
when d¯ < A (s12, s23) .
(5)
[Figure 1 here.]
Consider first du (s12, s23), which represents the optimal level of public debt when it
6Proof of A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) is as follows. Suppose, to the contrary, that A (s12, s23) >
du (s12, s23), i.e., 0 > k/η+ s12− s23 holds. The period-2 budget constraint leads to c2 ≤ s12 + d− s23 <
s12 + k/η − s23, where the second inequality comes from d ≤ d¯ < k/η. Given c2 > 0, this implies that
0 < s12 + k/η − s23, which is a contradiction.
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satisfies the debt ceiling. Eq. (3) indicates that du (s12, s23) increases as (s12 − s23) and
β decrease. The term (s12 − s23), representing the period-2 consumption when there is
no debt issue, implies that the marginal utility of the period-2 consumption increases as
(s12 − s23) decreases. The term β, representing the present bias, implies that the period-
2 agents attach a larger weight on the period-2 consumption relative to the period-3
consumption as β decreases. Thus, the period-2 selves’ preferences for debt financing
increase as (s12 − s23) and β decrease.
More precisely, suppose first that (s12− s23) and β are high, such that d
u (s12, s23) ≤ 0
holds, then the optimal level of the public debt is below zero. In other words, the govern-
ment prefers to lend rather than borrow in the international market. However, lending is
not allowed in the present framework. Thus, the government’s choice is constrained by
the non-negativity constraint; the optimal level of public debt becomes d = 0, as illus-
trated in Panel (a) of Figure 1. When (s12− s23) and β are at moderate levels, such that
0 < du (s12, s23) < d¯, the government is not constrained by the non-negativity constraint
or the debt ceiling. Thus, its choice is d = du (s12, s23), as illustrated in Panel (b) of
Figure 1.
Finally, when (s12−s23) and β are low, such that d¯ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) holds, the government
may borrow over the debt ceiling. In particular, its decision depends on the relative
magnitude between A (s12, s23) and d¯. Since A (s12, s23) is decreasing in γ, which represents
the costs of rule breaking, the government finds it is optimal to follow the rule and issues
debt up to the limit, d = d¯, when γ is large, such that A (s12, s23) ≤ d¯, as illustrated
in Panel (c) of Figure 1. However, rule breaking occurs when γ is low, such that d¯ <
A (s12, s23), as illustrated in Panel (d) of Figure 1.
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3.2 Agents’ Period-2 Decision
Next, we consider the period-2 agents’ decision regarding one-period securities, s23. The
problem is
max
s23
V2 (s23; s12, d
e) ≡
(s12 + d
e − s23)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
+ β ·
[k − s12 + s23 −G (d
e)]1−σ − 1
1− σ
,
s.t. G(de) =


(1 + η)de when de ≤ d¯,
(1 + η + γ)de − γd¯ when de > d¯,
s23 ≥ 0,
s12 and d
e,
where V2 denotes the period-2 agent’s objective function. The first-order condition with
respect to s23 leads to:
s23 = s
u
23 (s12, d
e) ≡ s12 −
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
de
1 + (β)1/σ
when de ≤ d¯, (6)
s23 = s
c
23
(
s12, d
e, d¯
)
≡ s12 −
k + γd¯−
[
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
]
de
1 + (β)1/σ
when de > d¯. (7)
With the private borrowing constraint, s23 ≥ 0, and the expectation of d = d
e, an optimal
level of s23, denoted by s
opt
23,d=de , is given by
sopt23,d=de =


0 when de ≤ d¯ and s12 ≤ S
u (de) ,
su23 (s12, d
e) when de ≤ d¯ and s12 > S
u (de) ,
0 when de > d¯ and s12 ≤ S
c
(
de, d¯
)
,
sc23
(
s12, d
e, d¯
)
when de > d¯ and s12 > S
c
(
de, d¯
)
,
(8)
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where Su (de) and Sc
(
de, d¯
)
are defined as follows:
Su (de) ≡
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
de
1 + (β)1/σ
, (9)
Sc
(
de, d¯
)
≡
k + γd¯−
[
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
]
de
1 + (β)1/σ
. (10)
The period-2 selves attach a larger weight to period-2 consumption than the period-1
selves. This implies that the former selves are induced to increase their period-2 con-
sumption by lowering their saving in s23. In particular, the period-2 selves find it optimal
to save nothing in s23 when the expectation of d
e is low and/or when the saving in one-
period securities, s12, by the period-1 selves is low, such that either s12 ≤ S
u (de) or
s12 ≤ S
c
(
de, d¯
)
holds. If this were not the case, the period-2 selves could afford to save a
portion of the return from one-period securities, s12, in s23.
3.3 Agents’ Period-1 Decision
Consider the period-1 agent’s decision regarding one-period securities, s12. The problem
is:
max
s12
V1 (s12, d
e) ≡
(
s12 + d
e − sopt23,de
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ
+
[
k − s12 + s
opt
23,de −G (d
e)
]1−σ
− 1
1− σ
s.t. G(de) =


(1 + η)de when de ≤ d¯,
(1 + η + γ)de − γd¯ when de > d¯,
0 ≤ s12 ≤ k,
where V1 denotes the period-1 agent’s objective function. It is assumed that period-1 and
-2 selves have the same expectation for d. Given the expectation of d = de and s23, the
period-1 agent chooses s12 to maximize his/her objective. Let s
opt
12,de denote the solution
12
to the problem. The solution satisfies the following first-order condition:
∂V1 (s12, d
e)
∂s12
=
(
1−
∂sopt23,de
∂s12
)
·
(
s12 + d
e − sopt23,de
)−σ
−
(
1−
∂sopt23,de
∂s12
)
·
[
k − s12 + s
opt
23,de −G (d
e)
]−σ
≤ 0, (11)
where a strict inequality holds if s12 = 0.
4 Equilibrium
Having described the behavior of agents and the government, we define an equilibrium in
the present framework as follows.
Definition 1: A rational expectations equilibrium is an allocation (s12, s13, s23, c2, c3, d),
such that (i) s12 = s
opt
12,de solves the period-1 agent’s problem given s23 and d = d
e; (ii)
s23 = s
opt
23,de solves the period-2 agent’s problem given s12 and d = d
e; (iii) rational
expectations hold, that is, the solution to the period-2 government’s problem, d,
satisfies d
(
sopt12,de , s
opt
23,de
)
= de; and (iv) given s12 = s
opt
12,de , s23 = s
opt
23,de , and d =
d
(
sopt12,d, s
opt
23,d
)
, the allocation (s13, c2, c3) is determined by the period-1, -2, and -3
budget constraints.
To characterize the equilibrium allocation, we proceed with the analysis in the follow-
ing manner. First, we assume that period-1 and -2 selves have expectations of de = 0,
du ∈
(
0, d¯
)
, d¯, or dc(> d¯), where du and dc denote the expectations of agents that the
debt issuance is below or above the ceiling, d¯, respectively. Given the expectation of
the debt issuance, we solve for one-period securities, s12 = s
opt
12,de and s23 = s
opt
23,de . Then
we substitute these into the solution d = d (s12, s23) for the government problem, and
identify the condition in which the expectations are rational. The following proposition
presents the equilibrium level of public debt. The corresponding allocation of savings and
consumption is presented in the Appendices A and B.
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Proposition 1. (Equilibrium Public Debt)
(i) If present bias is weak, such that 1/(1 + η) ≤ β holds, then the equilibrium debt is
below the ceiling, d < d¯.
(ii) If present bias is mild, such that 1/ (1 + η + γ) ≤ β ≤ 1/(1+η), then the equilibrium
debt is (a) below the ceiling, d < d¯, if k/
[
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
< d¯, and (b) up
to the ceiling, d = d¯, otherwise.
(iii) If present bias is strong, such that β ≤ 1/ (1 + η + γ) holds, then equilibrium debt is
(a) below the ceiling, d < d¯, if k/
[
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
< d¯; (b) up to the ceil-
ing, d = d¯, if k/
[
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
]
≤ d¯ ≤ k/
[
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
;
and (c) beyond the ceiling, d > d¯, otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
[Figure 2 here.]
Figure 2 illustrates the result in Proposition 1. In the current framework, present-
biased agents are incentivized in period 2 to rebalance their portfolios by issuing public
debt. When the bias is weak and the costs of debt issue are large, such that β ≥ 1/(1 +
η) holds, agents find it optimal to issue no debt because the benefit of public debt is
outweighed by its costs. However, they prefer public debt issue when the bias is strong
and the costs of debt issue are small, such that β < 1/(1+η) holds. The equilibrium debt
level falls below the ceiling when the debt limit is loose, k/
[
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
< d¯;
otherwise, the debt level reaches the ceiling. In particular, the agents prefer to issue
debt above the ceiling when overissue is allowed by incurring additional costs. Such a
case occurs if the present bias is extremely strong and the debt ceiling is fairly low,
such that β ≤ 1/ (1 + η + γ) and d¯ < k/
[
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
]
hold. This result
could be viewed as a possible key to understanding why the conditions required for fiscal
institutions are rarely met in practice, as reported in the Introduction.
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5 Vote on Debt Rule
The analysis, thus far, has assumed that the government takes the fiscal rule, represented
by d¯, as given. This assumption, which follows Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015), is reason-
able in the short run, but in the long run there must be a tendency toward revising fiscal
rules, as described in the Introduction. This section extends the analysis in the previous
sections by introducing endogenous determination of the debt rule, and it investigates
how the present bias affects, via voting, the design of the debt rules.
For analysis, we assume that the debt rule is determined before the period-1 selves’
decision on saving, s12 and s13. Thus, the debt rule is set to maximize the period-1 selves’
indirect utility. Within this setting, we consider two cases, β ≥ 1/ (1 + η + γ), which
produces no rule breaking, and β < 1/ (1 + η + γ), which involves the possibility of rule
breaking when d¯ is given, and we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. The optimal debt ceiling for the period-1 selves, d¯∗, is
d¯∗ =


0 if β ≥ 1
1+η+γ
,
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
if β < 1
1+η+γ
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
[Figure 3 here.]
Figure 3 illustrates the result in Proposition 2. When the present bias is weak, such
that β ≥ 1/ (1 + η + γ) holds, period-2 selves, as voters, have little incentive to issue
public debt. This implies that they follow the debt rule, even if the ceiling is set at the
lowest level, d¯ = 0; that is, the issuance of public debt is prohibited. Therefore, the
period-1 selves find it optimal to set d¯ = 0, which is optimal from the perspective of
their utility maximization. The resulting allocation is, thus, the first-best solution to the
period-1 selves’ problem.
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When the present bias is strong, such that β < 1/ (1 + η + γ), the period-1 selves
are unable to set d¯ = 0. Instead, they set the debt ceiling at a level that induces the
period-2 selves to issue public debt up to the ceiling. The mechanism behind this result
is as follows. As described above, period-1 selves prefer no public debt issue; thus, from
the viewpoint of their utility maximization they want to prohibit debt issue in period
2. However, given such a strict constraint, period-2 selves with strongly present-biased
preferences are incentivized to issue public debt beyond the ceiling because the marginal
benefit of this rule breaking outweighs its cost for the period-2 selves. Given this response
by the period-2 selves, the period-1 selves find it impossible to maintain the prohibition
of public debt issuance. To avoid the costs of rule breaking, they set the ceiling at a
maximum level, such that the period-2 selves never break it.
The result in Proposition 2 indicates that the optimal debt ceiling for the period-1
selves varies at the threshold level, β = 1/ (1 + η + γ), in a discontinuous manner, as
depicted in Figure 3. In other words, a slight difference in the present bias around the
threshold produces large differences in the debt rules and resulting levels of public debt
between countries. This result could be viewed as providing a possible explanation for
the differences in debt rules and resulting levels of public debt among countries sharing
similar economic backgrounds but different preferences.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a theoretical framework to examine the political process determining
public debt policy when voters are endowed with present-biased preferences. Specifically,
we consider a situation in which debt issue is distortionary and constrained by the debt
ceiling, but rule breaking, that is, debt issuance above the ceiling, is available through the
incurrence of additional costs. Within this framework, we established that violations of
fiscal rules, which are often observed in developed countries, occur when the present bias
is strong and the debt ceiling is fairly low. We also studied the endogenous determination
of the debt ceiling through voting and showed the debt rule polarization across countries:
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the debt ceiling is set at a zero when the bias is weak, whereas it is set at some positive
level when the bias is strong.
The result provides several policy implications for the international coordination of
fiscal policies, such as that observed within European Union member states. The first
result implies that states are more likely to deviate from international coordination, such
as the Maastricht criteria, as they become more present biased. The second result implies
that international agreements on strict debt rules can be formed and followed only by
states endowed with weak present-biased preferences. These implications should be viewed
with caution because they are derived using a simple analytical framework. However,
they could provide one possible explanation for the success and failure of international
agreements on fiscal rules.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and the Equilibrium Allocation
This appendix provides the proof of Proposition 1, focusing on the case of d > d¯ in
Proposition 1(iii). Because of space limitations, the proofs of the other parts of Proposition
1 are left to Appendix B. Derivation of the consumption allocation is omitted in the
following because it is immediate as a result of substituting saving and public debt into
the budget constraints.
A.1.1 Equilibrium with d > d¯
Suppose that period-1 and -2 selves expect that de = dc
(
> d¯
)
holds. Eq. (8) leads to the
savings of the period-2 Selves, when de = dc
(
> d¯
)
as follows:
sopt23,de=dc =


0 when s12 ≤ S
c
(
dc, d¯
)
sc23
(
s12, d
c, d¯
)
when s12 > S
c
(
dc, d¯
) (A.1)
where sc23
(
s12, d
c, d¯
)
and Sc
(
dc, d¯
)
are defined by
sc23
(
s12, d
c, d¯
)
≡ s12 −
k + γd¯−
[
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
]
dc
1 + (β)1/σ
,
Sc
(
dc, d¯
)
≡
k + γd¯−
[
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
]
dc
1 + (β)1/σ
.
Figure A.1 illustrates V1 (s12, d
e = dc). When s12 ≤ S
c
(
dc, d¯
)
holds, the first-order
Condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1 (s12, d
e = dc)
∂s12
= (s12 + d
c)−σ −
[
k − s12 − (1 + η + γ) d
c + γd¯
]−σ
≤ 0,
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where an interior solution is given by
s12 =
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ) dc
2
.
[Figure A.1 here.]
Alternatively, when s12 > S
c
(
dc, d¯
)
holds, the first-order condition, with respect to
s12 in (11), becomes
∂V1 (s12, d
e = dc)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
c
(
dc, d¯
)
holds. Notice that
V1 (s12, d
e = dc) is continuous at s12 = S
c
(
dc, d¯
)
, as illustrated in Figure A.1.
The interior solution of s12 and threshold value S
c
(
dc, d¯
)
are compared as follows:
Sc
(
dc, d¯
)
⋛
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ) dc
2
⇔ dc ⋚
k + γd¯
η + γ
.
In addition, the following conditions hold:
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ) dc
2
⋛ 0⇔ dc ⋚
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
,
Sc
(
dc, d¯
)
⋛ 0⇔ dc ⋚
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
.
Furthermore, the three threshold values of dc are ranked as
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
<
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
<
k + γd¯
η + γ
.
The analysis thus far suggests that the allocation of (s12, s23) is given by
s12 > 0, s23 = 0 if d
c < k+γd¯
2+η+γ
< k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
< k+γd¯
η+γ
,
s12 = 0, s23 = 0 if
k+γd¯
2+η+γ
≤ dc < k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
< k+γd¯
η+γ
,
s12 ∈ [0, k] , s23 = s
c
23
(
s12, d
c, d¯
)
if k+γd¯
2+η+γ
< k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
≤ dc < k+γd¯
η+γ
,
s12 ∈ [0, k] , s23 = s
c
23
(
s12, d
c, d¯
)
if k+γd¯
2+η+γ
< k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
< k+γd¯
η+γ
≤ dc.
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Based on this classification, the optimal levels of s12 and s23, when d
e = dc(> d¯), are
given as follows:
(i) sopt12,de=dc =
k+γd¯−(2+η+γ)dc
2
, sopt23,de=dc = 0 when d
c < k+γd¯
2+η+γ
,
(ii) sopt12,de=dc = 0, s
opt
23,de=dc = 0 when
k+γd¯
2+η+γ
≤ dc < k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
,
(iii) sopt12,de=dc ∈ [0, k] , s
opt
23,de=dc = s12 −
k+γd¯−[(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ]d¯
1+(β)1/σ
when k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
≤ dc.
(A.2)
In what follows, we determine the conditions, such that the expectation of de = dc(> d¯)
is rational, for the three cases in (A.2).
Case of dc <
(
k + γd¯
)
/ (2 + η + γ)
From (4) and (A.2), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following conditions hold:
dc =
k + γd¯−
[
1 + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
]
k+γd¯−(2+η+γ)dc
2
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
and dc <
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
,
or
[
1− (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
]
·
[(
k + γd¯
)
− (η + γ) dc
]
= 0 and dc <
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
. (A.3)
The first condition in (A.3) indicates that the rational expectation of public debt is given
by
dc


∈
(
d¯, k
η
)
if β = 1
1+η+γ
,
= k+γd¯
η+γ
if β ̸= 1
1+η+γ
.
When β ̸= 1/ (1 + η + γ), dc =
(
k + γd¯
)
/ (η + γ) must satisfy the second condition
in (A.3):
dc =
k + γd¯
η + γ
<
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
,
but this inequality condition fails to hold. Alternatively, when β = 1/ (1 + η + γ),
dc ∈
(
d¯, k/η
)
with the second condition in (A.3) gives the equilibrium level for ratio-
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nal expectation of public debt as
d ∈
(
d¯,
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
)
,
where the set is nonempty if d¯ < k/(2 + η).
Proposition A.1. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
β =
1
1 + η + γ
and d¯ <
k
2 + η
.
There is a rational expectations equilibrium with d ∈
(
d¯,
(
k + γd¯
)
/ (2 + η + γ)
)
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k + γd¯− (η + γ) d
2
,
k + γd¯− ηd
2
,
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ)d
2
,
k − γd¯+ (2 + η + γ)d
2
, 0
)
.
Case of
(
k + γd¯
)
/ (2 + η + γ) ≤ dc <
(
k + γd¯
)
/
(
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
)
From (4) and (A.2), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following conditions hold:
dc =
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
and
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
/ ≤ dc <
k + γd¯
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
. (A.4)
This level of public debt is above the limit, d¯, if
d¯ <
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
⇔ d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
.
In addition, dc must satisfy the second condition in (A.4):
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
≤ dc =
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
<
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
.
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The first inequality holds if and only if β ≤ 1/ (1 + η + γ), and the second inequality
always holds.
Proposition A.2. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
β ≤
1
1 + η + γ
and d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
.
There is a rational expectations equilibrium with
d =
(
k + γd¯
)
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
∈
(
d¯,
k
η
)
,
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
( (
k + γd¯
)
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
,
(β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
(
k + γd¯
)
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
, 0, k, 0
)
.
Case of
(
k + γd¯
)
/
(
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
)
≤ dc
From (4) and (A.2), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following condition holds:
dc =
(
k + γd¯
)
−
[
1 + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
]
k+γd¯−[(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ]dc
1+(β)1/σ
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
and
(
k + γd¯
)
/
(
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
)
≤ dc, or
k + γd¯
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
≤ dc =
k + γd¯
η + γ
.
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The associated level of s23 is
sopt23,de=dc = s12 +
k + γd¯
η + γ
,
and the corresponding consumption levels are c2 = c3 = 0, which contradicts the first-
order conditions with respect to c2 and c3. Thus, there is no rational expectations equi-
librium in this case.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
When β ≥ 1/(1 + η + γ), the allocation of consumption for a given d¯ is
(c2, c3) =


(
k+γd¯−(η+γ)d
2
, k+γd¯−ηd
2
)
with d ∈
(
d¯, k+γd¯
2+η+γ
)
when β = 1
1+η+γ
and d¯ < k
2+η
,(
k−ηd¯
2
, k−ηd¯
2
)
when 1
1+η+γ
≤ β ≤ 1
1+η
and d¯ < k
2+η
,(
k−ηd
2
, k−ηd
2
)
with d ∈
(
0,min
{
k
2+η
, d¯
})
when β = 1
1+η
,(
k
2
, k
2
)
when β ≥ 1
1+η
,
where the first, second, third, and fourth allocations come from Propositions A.1, B.4,
B.2, and B.1, respectively. For each allocation, c2 and c3 are set at c2 = c3 = k/2 by
choosing d¯ = 0. This allocation of consumption is consistent with the solution to the
following period-1 selves’ utility maximization problem:
max
(c2)
1−σ
1− σ
+
(c3)
1−σ
1− σ
s.t. c2 + c3 ≤ k.
Thus, the optimal level of d¯, when β ≥ 1/(1 + η + γ), is d¯ = 0.
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When β < 1/(1 + η + γ), the equilibrium allocation of consumption for a given d¯ is
(c2, c3) =


(
k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β(1+η+γ))1/σ
,
(β(1+η+γ))1/σ(k+γd¯)
(1+η+γ)+(β(1+η+γ))1/σ
)
when 0 ≤ d¯ < k
(1+η)+(β(1+η+γ))1/σ
,
(
d¯, k − (1 + η)d¯
)
when k
(1+η)+(β(1+η+γ))1/σ
≤ d¯ < k
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
,(
k
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
, (β(1+η))
1/σk
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
)
when k
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
≤ d¯,
where the first, second, and third allocations come from Propositions A.2, B.5, and B.3,
respectively. Thus, the period-1 selves’ indirect utility, V1, becomes:
V1 =


V1A ≡
1
1−σ
{[
k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β(1+η+γ))1/σ
]1−σ [
1 + (β(1 + η + γ))(1−σ)/σ
]
− 2
}
when 0 ≤ d¯ < k
(1+η)+(β(1+η+γ))1/σ
,
V1B ≡
1
1−σ
{
(d)1−σ + [k − (1 + η)d]1−σ − 2
}
when k
(1+η)+(β(1+η+γ))1/σ
≤ d¯ < k
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
,
V1C ≡
{[
k
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
]1−σ [
1 + (β(1 + η))(1−σ)/σ
]
− 2
}
when k
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
≤ d¯.
The function V1 is continuous for d¯ ∈ (0,∞) because the following properties hold:
lim
d¯→ k
(1+η)+(β(1+η+γ))1/σ
V1A = V1B
(
k
(1 + η) + (β(1 + η + γ))1/σ
)
and
lim
d¯→ k
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
V1B = V1C
(
k
(1 + η) + (β(1 + η))1/σ
)
.
In addition, the differentiation of V1i(i = A,B,C) with respect to d¯ leads to
∂V1A
∂d¯
=
[
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β(1 + η + γ))1/σ
]−σ
γ
[
1 + (β(1 + η + γ))(1−σ)/σ
]
> 0,
∂V1B
∂d¯
= (d)−σ − (1 + η) [k − (1 + η)d]−σ ,
∂V1C
∂d¯
= 0,
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where the following condition holds:
∂V1B
∂d¯
≷ 0⇔ d¯ ≶
k
(1 + η) + (1 + η)1/σ
.
Given the assumption of β < 1/(1 + η + γ), we have
k
(1 + η) + (1 + η)1/σ
<
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
,
implying that V1B is decreasing in d¯ for the range of
[
k/[(1 + η) + (β(1 + η + γ))1/σ],
k/[(1 + η) + (β(1 + η))1/σ]
)
. Thus, the optimal d¯ becomes d¯ = k/[(1+η)+(β(1 + η + γ))1/σ],
and the corresponding allocation of saving, consumption, and public debt is given by
(s12, s13,c2, c3) =
(
0, 0,
k
(1 + η) + (β(1 + η + γ))1/σ
,
(β(1 + η + γ))1/σ k
(1 + η) + (β(1 + η + γ))1/σ
)
and
d¯ =
k
(1 + η) + (β(1 + η + γ))1/σ
.
■
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B Supplementary Materials (Not for Publication)
This appendix provides the proof of Proposition 1 for cases of d ≤ d¯.
B.1 Equilibrium with d < d¯
In this subsection, we first show the equilibrium with d = 0, and then show the equilibrium
with d ∈
(
0, d¯
)
.
B.1.1 Equilibrium with d = 0
Suppose that period-1 and -2 selves expect that de = 0 holds. Eq. (8) leads to saving by
period-2 selves when de = 0 as follows:
sopt23,de=0 =


0 when s12 ≤ S
u(0) ≡ k
1+(β)1/σ
,
su23 (s12, 0) ≡ s12 −
k
1+(β)1/σ
when s12 > S
u(0) ≡ k
1+(β)1/σ
.
Panel (a) of Figure B.1 illustrates V1 (s12, d
e = 0). When s12 ≤ S
u(0) holds, the first-
order condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1 (s12, d
e = 0)
∂s12
= (s12)
−σ − (k − s12)
−σ ≤ 0. (B.1)
An interior solution, given by s12 = k/2, is feasible because it holds that s12 = k/2 <
Su(0) ≡ k/
[
1 + (β)1/σ
]
. Thus, an optimal level of s12 is s12 = k/2 when s12 ≤ S
u(0), as
illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure B.1.
[Figure B.1 here.]
Alternatively, when s12 > S
u(0) holds, the first-order condition, with respect to s12 in
(11), becomes
∂V1 (s12, d
e = 0)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
u(0) (see Panel (a) of Figure
B.1). Notice that V1 is continuous at s12 = S
u(0).
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Given the expectation of de = 0, the optimal level of s12 becomes
sopt12,de=0 =
k
2
,
and the corresponding level of s23 is s
opt
23,de=0 = 0. From (5), the expectation of d
e = 0 is
rational if the following condition holds:
du
(
sopt12,de=0 =
k
2
, sopt23,de=0 = 0
)
≤ 0⇔ β ≥
1
1 + η
.
Proposition B.1. Suppose that β ≥ 1/ (1 + η) holds. There is a rational expectations
equilibrium with d = 0 and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k
2
,
k
2
,
k
2
,
k
2
, 0
)
.
B.1.2 Equilibrium with d ∈
(
0, d¯
)
Suppose that period-1 and -2 selves expect that de = du ∈
(
0, d¯
)
holds. Eq. (8) leads to
saving by period-2 selves when de = du ∈
(
0, d¯
)
as follows:
sopt23,de=du =


0 when s12 ≤ S
u(du),
su23 (s12, d
u) when s12 > S
u(du),
(B.2)
where su23 (s12, d
u) and Su(du) are defined as
su23 (s12, d
u) ≡ s12 −
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
du
1 + (β)1/σ
,
Su(du) ≡
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
du
1 + (β)1/σ
.
Panel (b) of Figure B.1 illustrates V1 (s12, d
e = du). When s12 ≤ S
u(du) holds, the
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first-order condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1 (s12, d
e = du)
∂s12
= (s12 + d
u)−σ − [k − s12 − (1 + η) d
u]−σ ≤ 0,
where an interior solution, given by s12 = [k − (2 + η) d
u] /2, is feasible if it satisfies the
following:
k − (2 + η) du
2
< Su(du)⇔ du <
k
η
.
This condition is satisfied under Assumption 1, d¯ < k/η, and the definition of du(< d¯).
Alternatively, when s12 > S
u(du) holds, the first-order condition, with respect to s12
in (11), becomes:
∂V1 (s12, d
e = du)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
u(du) holds. Notice that V1 is
continuous at s12 = S
u(du), and that
k − (2 + η) du
2
> 0⇔ du <
k
2 + η
,
Su(du) > 0⇔ du <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
.
Given these properties, we can conclude that the optimal levels of s12 and s23, when
de = du, become
(i) sopt12,de=du =
k−(2+η)du
2
, sopt23,de=du = 0 when d
u < k
2+η
,
(ii) sopt12,de=du = 0, s
opt
23,de=du = 0 when
k
2+η
≤ du < k
(1+η)+(β)1/σ
,
(iii) sopt12,de=du ∈ [0, k] , s
opt
23,de=du = s12 −
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]du
1+(β)1/σ
when k
(1+η)+(β)1/σ
≤ du.
(B.3)
In what follows, we determine the conditions such that the expectation of de = du is
rational for the three cases in (B.3).
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Case of du < k/(2 + η)
From (3) and (B.3), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following conditions hold:
du =
k −
[
1 + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
·
(
sopt12,de=du − s
opt
23,de=du
)
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
and du <
k
2 + η
,
or [
1− (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
· ηdu =
[
1− (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
· k and du <
k
2 + η
. (B.4)
The first condition in (B.4) implies that the rational expectations level of du is given by
du


∈
(
0, d¯
)
when β (1 + η) = 1,
= k/η when β (1 + η) ̸= 1.
When β (1 + η) ̸= 1, the candidate for a solution is du = k/η. This candidate is not
suitable for the solution because a focus on the case of d < d¯ and d¯ < k/η is assumed
in Assumption 1. When β (1 + η) = 1, any level of du ∈
(
0, d¯
)
with du < k/(2 + η) is
rational. Thus, the equilibrium level of public debt becomes
d ∈
(
0,min
{
k
2 + η
, d¯
})
.
Proposition B.2. Suppose that β (1 + η) = 1 holds. There is a rational expectations
equilibrium with d ∈
(
0,min
{
k/ (2 + η) , d¯
})
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k − ηd
2
,
k − ηd
2
,
k − (2 + η)d
2
,
k + (2 + η)d
2
, 0
)
.
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Case of k/(2 + η) ≤ du < k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
From (3) and (B.3), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following conditions hold:
du =
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
and
k
2 + η
≤ du <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
,
or
k
2 + η
≤
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
<
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
.
The first inequality holds if and only if β (1 + η) < 1; the second inequality always holds.
In addition, du must satisfy du < d¯, that is,
du =
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
< d¯.
Proposition B.3. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
β <
1
1 + η
and
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
< d¯.
There is a rational expectations equilibrium with d = k/
[
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
,
(β (1 + η))1/σ k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
, 0, k, 0
)
.
Case of k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
≤ du
From (3) and (B.3), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following conditions hold:
du =
k −
[
1 + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
·
(
sopt12,de=du − s
opt
23,de=du
)
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
and
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
≤ du,
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or
du =
k −
[
1 + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
·
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]·du
1+(β)1/σ
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
and
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
≤ du. (B.5)
Solving the first condition in (B.5) for du leads to du = k/η. Following the same reasoning
as the previous case, this candidate is not suitable for the solution. Thus, there is no
rational expectations equilibrium with k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
≤ d.
B.2 Equilibrium with d = d¯
Suppose that period-1 and -2 selves expect that de = d¯ holds. Equation (8) leads to the
period-2 selves’ saving when de = d¯ as follows:
sopt
23,de=d¯
=


0 when s12 ≤ S
u
(
d¯
)
,
s12 −
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]·d¯
1+(β)1/σ
when s12 > S
u
(
d¯
)
,
where Su
(
d¯
)
is defined as
Su
(
d¯
)
≡
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
· d¯
1 + (β)1/σ
.
Panel (c) of Figure B.1 illustrates V1
(
s12, d
e = d¯
)
. When s12 ≤ S
u
(
d¯
)
holds, the
first-order Condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1
(
s12, d
e = d¯
)
∂s12
=
(
s12 + d¯
)−σ
−
[
k − s12 − (1 + η)d¯
]−σ
≤ 0,
where an interior solution, given by s12 =
[
k − (2 + η) d¯
]
/2, is feasible because it satisfies
Su
(
d¯
)
>
[
k − (2 + η) d¯
]
/2 ⇔ k/η > d¯. Thus, the optimal level of s12 is given by
s12 =
[
k − (2 + η) d¯
]
/2 when s12 ≤ S
u
(
d¯
)
.
Alternatively, when s12 > S
u
(
d¯
)
holds, the first-order condition, with respect to s12
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in (11), becomes
∂V1
(
s12, d
e = d¯
)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
u
(
d¯
)
. Notice that V1 is
continuous at s12 = S
u
(
d¯
)
, and that
k − (2 + η) d¯
2
> 0⇔ d¯ <
k
2 + η
,
Su
(
d¯
)
> 0⇔ d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
.
Given these properties, we can conclude that the optimal levels of s12 and s23, when
de = d¯, become:
(i) sopt
12,de=d¯
= k−(2+η)d¯
2
, sopt
23,de=d¯
= 0 when d¯ < k
2+η
,
(ii) sopt
12,de=d¯
= 0, sopt
23,de=d¯
= 0 when k
2+η
≤ d¯ < k
(1+η)+(β)1/σ
,
(iii) sopt
12,de=d¯
∈ [0, k] , sopt
23,de=d¯
= s12 −
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]d¯
1+(β)1/σ
when k
(1+η)+(β)1/σ
≤ d¯.
(B.6)
In what follows, we determine the conditions, such that the expectation of de = d¯ is
rational, for the three cases in (B.6).
Case of d¯ < k/(2 + η)
From (5) and (B.6), the expectation of de = d¯ is rational if the following conditions hold:
A
(
sopt
12,de=d¯
=
k − (2 + η) d¯
2
, sopt
23,de=d¯
= 0
)
≤ d¯
≤ du
(
sopt
12,de=d¯
=
k − (2 + η) d¯
2
, sopt
23,de=d¯
= 0
)
and d¯ <
k
2 + η
. (B.7)
The first condition in (B.7) is reformulated as follows:
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
]
k−(2+η)d¯
2
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
≤ d¯⇔
1
1 + η + γ
≤ β,
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and
d¯ ≤
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
]
k−(2+η)d¯
2
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
⇔ β ≤
1
1 + η
.
The equilibrium conditions are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition B.4. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1
1 + η + γ
≤ β ≤
1
1 + η
and d¯ <
k
2 + η
.
There is a rational expectations equilibrium with d = d¯ and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k − ηd¯
2
,
k − ηd¯
2
,
k − (2 + η)d¯
2
,
k + (2 + η)d¯
2
, 0
)
.
B.2.1 Case of k/(2 + η) ≤ d¯ < k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
From (5) and (B.6), the expectation of de = d¯ is rational if the following condition holds:
A
(
sopt
12,de=d¯
= 0, sopt
23,de=d¯
= 0
)
≤ d¯ ≤ du
(
sopt
12,de=d¯
= 0, sopt
23,de=d¯
= 0
)
and
k
2 + η
≤ d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
,
that is, if
k
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
≤ d¯ ≤
k
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
and
k
2 + η
≤ d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
.
These are summarized as in the following propositions.
Proposition B.5. Suppose that the following condition holds:
max
{
k
2 + η
,
k
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
}
≤ d¯ ≤
k
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
.
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There is a rational expectations equilibrium with d = d¯ and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
d¯, k − (1 + η) d¯, 0, k, 0
)
.
Case of k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
≤ d¯
From (5) and (B.6), the expectation of de = d¯ is rational if the following condition holds:
A

sopt
12,de=d¯
∈ [0, k] , sopt
23,de=d¯
= s12 −
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
d¯
1 + (β)1/σ

 ≤ d¯
≤du

sopt
12,de=d¯
∈ [0, k] , sopt
23,de=d¯
= s12 −
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
d¯
1 + (β)1/σ

 and
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
≤ d¯.
The inequality d¯ ≤ du (·, ·) is rewritten as
d¯ ≤
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
]
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]d¯
1+(β)1/σ
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
⇔ η ≤ 0,
which fails to hold for any η > 0. Thus, there is no rational expectations equilibrium with
d = d¯ when k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
≤ d¯.
■
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Illustration of the period-2 government’s objective function when du(s12, s23) ≤
0 ≤ d¯ (Panel (a)), 0 < du(s12, s23) < d¯ (Panel (b)), A(s12, s23) ≤ d¯ ≤ d
u(s12, s23) (Panel
(c)), and d¯ < A(s12, s23) (Panel (d)).
36
Figure 2: Classification of the equilibrium states according to the level of public debt.
The horizontal axis takes β; the vertical axis takes d¯.
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Figure 3: The optimal debt ceiling for the period-1 selves according to β.
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(a) (b)
Figure A.1: Illustration of the period-1 selves’ utility, V1 (s12, de = dc), when[
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ)dc
]
/2 ≤ Sc
(
dc, d¯
)
(Panel (a)) and
[
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ)dc
]
/2 >
Sc
(
dc, d¯
)
(Panel (b)).
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure B.1: Illustration of the period-1 selves’utility when de = 0 (Panel (a)), de = du
(Panel (b)), and de = d¯ (Panel (c)).
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